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Abstract: By 2008, New York City’s school governing regime contained two market-creation 
policies. Each reshaped principal incentives. One closed large high schools, replacing them with 
four-to-eight small schools. Another replaced uniform district-provided services with eleven School 
Support Organizations (SSOs). Both aimed to empower principals with new discretion. This 
interview study of a small, stratified random sample of high school principals uses mixed methods to 
analyze 241 incidents detailing their reactions. Guiding questions include whether principals 
experienced the policies as empowering. Findings show that two thirds of the principals felt 
beleaguered rather than empowered; incentives appeared insufficient to provide them with 
unambiguous direction and confidence in their own decisions. The study concludes by considering 
what additional resources might be needed to expand the one third who felt empowered into a 
majority.   
Keywords: administrator responsibility; governance; policy analysis; urban programs  
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¿Con mayor poder o asediados? La responsabilidad de los directores/as en el contexto del 
régimen de diversidad de proveedores escolares en la ciudad de Nueva York    
Resumen: Para el año 2008, el régimen gobernando las escuelas de Nueva York  contenía 
dos políticas creación  de mercados educativos. Cada una reformuló los incentivos para los 
directores/as de escuelas. Una eliminó las grandes escuelas secundarias, sustituyéndolas con cuatro a 
ocho escuelas pequeñas. La otra reforma reemplazó  la prestación servicios centralizados  para el 
distrito escolar unificado por once organizaciones de apoyo escolar (SSO por su sigla en 
ingles). Ambas normas se proponían otorgar a los/as directores/as con nuevas facultades. Este 
estudio de entrevistas uso una pequeña muestra, estratificada y aleatoria de los/as directores/as de  
escuelas secundarias utilizando métodos mixtos para analizar 241casos, detallando las reacciones de 
los/as entrevistados. Preguntas de exploración incluyeron  saber si los/as directores/as 
experimentaron las políticas como factores de empoderamiento. Los resultados muestran que dos 
tercios de los/as directores/as se sintieron acosados en lugar de con mayor poder; los 
incentivos fueron  insuficientes para darles una direccionalidad clara y confianza en sus propias 
decisiones. Este estudio concluye estimando  que recursos adicionales podrían ser necesarios 
para ampliar el numero de los/as directores/as que  se sintieron con mayor poder para que sea la 
mayoría.  
Palabras clave: responsabilidad del administrador;  la gobernabilidad  análisis de 
políticas; programas urbanos. 
 
Com mais poder ou assediados? A responsabilidade dos/as diretores/as no contexto do 
regime de diversidade de provedores escolares na cidade de Nova York 
Resumo: Em 2008, o regime que rege as escolas em Nova York continha duas políticas  de 
criação de mercados educativos. Cada uma reformulou os incentivos para os diretores/as de 
escolas. Uma eliminou as grandes escolas secundárias, substituindo-as por quatro a oito  pequenas 
escolas. A outra substituiu a prestação de serviços para o Distrito Escolar Unificado por onze 
organizações de apoio escolar (SSO é a sigla em Inglês). Ambas as regras eram destinadas a dar 
novos poderes para os/as diretores/as. Este estudo de entrevista com uma pequena amostra, 
aleatória e estratificada de diretores/as de  escolas de Ensino Médio utiliza métodos mistos para 
analisar 241casos detalhando as reações dos respondentes. As perguntas incluíram interrogar se 
os/as diretores/as  experimentaram essas políticas como fatores de maior empoderamento. Os 
resultados mostram que dois terços dos/das diretores/as se sentiram perseguidos em vez de com 
mais poder; os incentivos foram insuficientes para dar um direcionamento claro e confiança em suas 
próprias decisões. Este estudo conclui estimando que recursos adicionais poderiam ser necessárias 
para ampliar o número de  diretores/as  que se sentiram com mais poder para sejam a maioria 
dos/as directores/as.  
Palavras-chave: responsabilidade dos/as diretores/as; a governabilidade; análise de políticas; 
programas urbanos. 
 
Introduction1 
This study examines New York City high school principals’ reactions to two policies 
intended to enhance their authority. First, enhanced family choice from among more than 200 new 
small high schools was intended to encourage principals to compete for students and teachers by 
                                                
1 Special thanks to Alisha Ozeri and Thomas Feeney for data collection assistance, Ronald Neath and Karl 
Kronenbusch for data analysis advice, Larry Cuban, Jeffrey Henig and Catherine Di Martino for early 
readings, and the PSC-CUNY grant program at Baruch College for partial research support.  
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focusing on a target educational market (Quint, Smith, Unterman, & Moedano, 2010). Second, to 
increase their control and willingness to innovate, they were required to purchase educational 
support services from one of many district-approved vendors (New York City Department of 
Education, 2007a). Under each policy, school principals are the key decision makers. In the jargon of 
the current regime, they are empowered (New York City Department of Education, 2007a).  
Each of these two policies exists within the context of high-stakes accountability for 
principals, including both financial rewards and the potential of being fired. In this context, the two 
policies examined here—hundreds of new small high schools and a market of School Support 
Organizations—can be understood as essential elements of a particular reform–oriented governing 
regime. Together they move the district away from a governing regime dominated by what Clarence 
Stone and colleagues have characterized as bureaucratic compliance to a market-based governing 
regime designed to enhance efficiency and innovation (Bulkley, Henig, & Levin, 2010; C. N. Stone, 
Henig, Jones, & Pierannunzi, 2001).  
Why study principals’ reactions? Hiring and retaining strong principals is widely believed to 
be among the key policy levers for teacher retention (Boyd et al., 2011), professional growth (Drago-
Severson, 2007), school climate (safety, relationships and environment) (Cohen, McCabe, Michelli, 
& Pikeral, 2009), parental and community involvement (B. S. Simon, 2001), and organizational 
management (Grissom & Loeb, 29 March, 2011), all indirectly affecting student achievement 
(Leithwood, Louis, Anderson, & Wahlstrom, 2004). Principals’ “role of policy mediator for the 
entire organization” means that they “determine the conditions under which policy interpretation 
and implementation will take place” (Leithwood, Louis, Anderson, & Wahlstrom, 2004, p.35). How 
principals react to policies is crucial to understanding educational policy effects. Research on their 
reactions is especially important when the policies are novel, interact, and have strong consequences. 
The focus of this paper is on understanding how principals make sense of the new incentives 
in this high-stakes policy environment and whether they interpret the incentives as New York City 
policy-makers intended. We asked: How do principals experience the accountability implications of 
new small high schools on the one hand, and of creating a market of school support service 
providers on the other? Specifically, how do principals leading small and large high schools describe 
their responsibilities? How are high school principals’ choices of School Support Organizations 
reflected in their responses? Who feels empowered by these policies?  
Our analysis shows how the policies interact in complex ways that were not predicted by 
policy-makers’ theoretical (or ideological) assumptions. We found that by identifying the particular 
School Support Organization engaged, we could predict the amount of conflict the principal would 
report between district expectations and his or her professional judgment. Although each principal 
chose his or her SSO, the choices were sometimes influenced by school size and were heavily 
influenced by the principal’s prior on-the-job experience. The other independent variable affecting 
principal reactions to accountability was the level of academic challenge a school faces. Overall, the 
principals who described themselves as empowered were a distinct minority; most described 
themselves as beleaguered or overwhelmed. Although the sample of high school principals 
interviewed for this study was randomly selected, and mirrored the New York City high school 
principal population at the time of the interviews, these findings should be considered suggestive 
because the sample was small (n=18). 
 
Governing Regimes and Forms of Accountability 
The research described here rests on two assumptions: First, school districts are governed by 
a range of distinct governing regimes, each providing essential context for any in-depth study of 
accountability. Second, school leaders do not simply react to policy makers’ expectations; instead 
principals enact their accountability environments. That is, they attend to some kinds of information 
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and downplay others, thus framing problems in particular ways. A principal’s enactment of 
accountability might weigh personal, professional or political influences more heavily than 
bureaucratic requirements or market incentives. Thus, it is inaccurate to assume that policy 
incentives are the only, or even the most important influence on principals. 
 
Governing Regimes 
The view that school districts are governed by different types of regimes is based on 
historical and case research (C. N. Stone, 2005; C. N. Stone, Henig, Jones, & Pierannunzi, 2001).  
Second generation analysis of this research extends Clarence Stone’s distinctions between status quo 
and activist regimes by distinguishing among different types of activist regimes, each of which has a 
distinctive logic of accountability (Bulkley, 2007; Henig, 2010; Shipps, 2006, 2008).  
Table 1 displays a typology of school governing regimes, identifying the anticipated form of 
accountability and agent responses.2 The Administrative Regime is based on Clarence Stone’s 
observation that many school governing regimes do not challenge the underlying logic and structure 
of hierarchical administrator-run district governance (C. N. Stone, Henig, Jones, & Pierannunzi, 
2001).3 Such regimes reflect the professional administrative ideal sought and largely attained in the 
early 20th Century (Tyack, 1974; Tyack & Hansot, 1982). Today, the Administrative Regime is the 
bureaucratic status quo alternative to any activist regime, and is characterized by the importance of 
training, formal credentials, technical routines, and educator cohesion. Compliance with bureaucratic 
mandates, including certification requirements and established norms, constitutes a full 
demonstration of accountability in this governing regime. 
Table 1 also expands upon Stone’s notion of an activist governing regime intent on changing 
the agenda, the preferred accountability type, and the essential actors, resources, and relationships. It 
identifies distinctions between types of activist regimes, including Professional Regimes, 
Empowerment Regimes and Market Regimes. A Professional Regime relies on classroom educators 
whose expertise in teaching and learning is at the center of decision-making and governance. Its 
form of accountability relies primarily on professional discretion, constrained by norms of 
professional practice and influenced by pedagogical values (Darling-Hammond, 1996; Darling-
Hammond & Ascher, 1991). Empowerment Regimes enhance the district’s political responsiveness 
to particular interest groups or constituencies. Under some reform agendas the newly empowered 
may be parents and neighbors seeking community control of the schools (Hess Jr., 1991); other 
agendas include unions (Kerchner & Koppich, 2000). In either case, accountability rests on 
demonstrated evidence of political responsiveness to the expectations of the empowered interest 
groups. Market Regimes rely on performance or market incentives for their accountability, including 
both competition-driven incentives like waiting lists and efficiency–driven ones like employee 
incentives. All Market Regimes seek to restructure governance so that customers, contracts and 
employee incentives drive decisions, rather than political responsiveness, professional discretion or 
bureaucratic routines.  
 
                                                
2 See Shipps (2006) for an earlier version. Its inspiration is Clarence Stone’s typology of general-purpose 
urban governing regimes (C. N. Stone, 1993). 
3 Stone named this type of regime the Employment Regime, to convey the importance it puts on maintaining 
the norms and expectations of ongoing employment opportunities within the school system, and to contrast 
this with activist regimes focused more on student performance outcomes.  
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Table 1 
Four Ideal Types of Governing Regimes and Their Theoretical Characteristics 
 
Regime! Agenda Preferred 
Accountabili
ty 
Essential 
Actors 
Essential 
Resources 
Essential 
Relationships 
Administrative  
Regime 
 
 
Sustain system 
by buffering it 
from political 
interference  
Bureaucratic 
mandates 
Teachers, 
Administrators, 
School board 
Technical routines 
Established norms 
Legitimate training 
and credentials 
Educator cohesion 
Accepted benefit 
distribution 
 
Solidarity 
among 
educators and 
skepticism 
about external 
change agents 
Professional 
Regime 
Change the 
pedagogy and 
the culture of 
the schools 
Professional 
discretion 
Teachers, 
Parents, 
Administrators, 
Elected officials 
Educator expertise  
Parental 
commitment 
Inter-group 
mediation  
Legitimate 
pedagogical 
alternatives 
Increased 
government funding 
 
Trust between 
parents and 
educators 
across class, 
race and ethnic 
lines 
Empower
ment  
Regime 
Authorize new 
decision makers 
to enable better, 
unprecedented 
decisions 
Political 
responsiven
ess 
New decision 
makers, 
Education 
interest groups,  
Elected and 
appointed 
officials 
New governing 
institutions 
Cohesive group 
representation 
Uncorrupted 
leadership 
Inter-group 
mediation 
Legitimate governing 
alternatives 
Benefit redistribution 
 
Pacts by 
interest groups 
to share 
decision arenas 
and decision 
making 
Market  
Regimes 
Restructure 
schooling for 
efficiency and 
accountability 
(corporate) or  
Restructure 
schooling for 
competition and 
choice 
(entrepreneurial) 
Performance 
or  
Market 
incentives  
System 
managers, 
Business elites,  
(corporate) or 
System 
managers, 
Private 
providers,  
Parents  
(entrepreneurial) 
Engaged market 
sector 
Revised regulations   
Public investment in 
markets 
Consumer 
information 
Legitimate market 
actors 
Performance 
incentives 
(corporate) or 
Private financing for 
startups 
(entrepreneurial) 
Contracts and 
regulations that 
mediate 
consumer and 
producer roles 
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Since taking control of New York City’s schools in 2002 Mayor Michael Bloomberg has 
created a particular type of Market Regime. Table 2 illustrates how Bloomberg’s version of a Diverse 
Provider Regime borrows from both corporate-style market regimes and entrepreneurial ones.  
 
Table 2 
Variations in Market Regimes 
 
Market Regime 
Type! Agenda! Preferred Accountability 
Mechanisms! Essential Actors! Essential Resources! Control Mechanisms!
Corporate 
Market Regime! Restructure schools for 
efficiency and 
accountability!
School 
managers given 
autonomy to 
compete for 
internal 
rewards.!
Business 
elites 
 
System 
managers 
 
Political 
allies!
Engaged market 
sector 
 
Revised regulations  
 
Public investment in 
markets 
 
Performance 
incentives!
Standardized 
evaluation 
 
Standardized 
educational 
services 
 
Tangible rewards 
and sanctions!
Entrepreneurial 
Market Regime ! Restructure schools for 
competition 
and client 
choice!
Autonomous 
schools 
compete for 
clients.!
Private 
sector 
providers 
 
Parents 
 
Political 
allies!
Public investment in 
markets 
 
Consumer 
information  
 
Legitimate market 
actors 
 
Private financing for 
startups!
Standardized 
certification 
processes 
 
Regulated market 
of schools 
 
Increased supply 
of schools!
Diverse 
Provider 
Regime! Restructure schools for accountability 
and choice!
School 
managers given 
autonomy to 
compete for 
internal rewards 
and school 
clients.  
 
Service 
providers 
compete for 
school 
contracts. 
 
Autonomous 
schools 
compete for 
clients.!
System 
managers 
 
Private 
sector 
providers 
 
Parents 
 
Political 
allies!
Revised regulations  
 
Public investment in 
markets and 
incentives 
 
Legitimate market 
actors 
 
Consumer 
information 
 
Private financing for 
startups!
Standardized 
evaluation 
processes 
 
Tangible rewards 
and sanctions 
 
Market of 
approved 
support services 
 
Regulated market 
of schools 
 
Increased supply 
of schools!
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A Corporate Market Regime requires that school principals compete with one another on 
standardized outcome measures. The goal, borrowed from corporate business models, is to 
encourage innovation by creating internal competition among managers who take responsibility for 
turning a reform idea into measurable improvements (Ouchi & Segal, 2003). To the extent that 
performance targets are pre-specified and standardized, the district’s coercive power is heightened. 
Employee incentives are expected to result in desired outcomes: The highest performers earn 
financial rewards; poor performers are dismissed. Such policies increase the principal’s authority to 
reject some kinds of instruction and to shape the school’s culture by screening staff and students.  
This type of structural competition is sometimes referred to as intrapreneuralism because it 
encourages the behaviors associated with entrepreneurialism within a large organization (Toftoy & 
Chatterjee, 2004). By 2008, such incentive-based governance reforms became common in states and 
districts across the nation (Hanawar & Olson, January 10, 2008). Yet satisfied intrapreneurs are 
uncommon, even in the corporate world. Although structural competition enhances middle level 
managers’ importance to their organizations—they lead internal work groups and link cross-
divisional teams—few such leaders feel liberated from bureaucracy. Instead, as Paul Osterman 
(2009) describes them, corporate middle managers facing structural competition feel “more subject 
to the control of top executives than in the past,” and consequently “less secure.” Their “stress 
levels have gone up sharply”, increasing their sense of learned powerlessness. Consequently, many 
middle managers have also “lost their sense of loyalty to their employers” and become more 
transient (pp. 7-9). If the same applies to schooling, a Corporate Market Regime predicts many 
stressed, insecure principals and high turnover. 
An Entrepreneurial Market Regime uses competition quite differently. Like Corporate 
Market Regimes, entrepreneurial ones allow principals to establish organizational norms of behavior, 
theoretically increasing their ability to block outside distractions. But in Entrepreneurial Market 
Regimes, principals must compete with one another for segmented markets of clients (families) and 
for similarly oriented staff. Client competition decreases the district’s coercive power because groups 
of like-minded clients—not bureaucratically enforced standards—set the limits of acceptable 
behavior (Levin, 2010). When teachers become free agents, markets also decrease principals’ 
coercive power over these subordinates.  
Many school systems are adopting regulatory reforms that encourage entrepreneurialism (See 
examples in Hess, 2008). Yet, for most, Entrepreneurial Market Regimes remain aspirational due to 
an insufficient supply of new schools and/or service providers (Adams & Hill, 2006) and uncertain 
regulatory environments (Levin, 2010).  Even so, advocates assume that these problems can be 
addressed with sufficient attention to human and financial capital development and quality control 
(Hess, 2008). New York City’s policy of seeding hundreds of new schools seems to represent one of 
a few opportunities to test this assumption. Yet its governing regime is not a straightforward 
empowerment one. 
Instead, New York City has a Diverse Provider Regime, which aims to counteract the 
weaknesses of entrepreneurialism with the benefits of corporatism, and vice-versa. It combines the 
standardized outcomes and internal competition of the Corporate Market Regime with an increased 
supply of schools and client choice adopted from Entrepreneurial Market Regimes. In Chancellor 
Joel Klein’s words, “Accountability, in most industries or professions, usually takes two 
forms…First and foremost markets impose accountability requirements...Second, high performance 
companies develop internal accountability.” Both involve competition because “collaboration is the 
elixir of the status-quo crowd” (Klein, June 2011, pp.4, 9).  
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Internal competition among principals for financial rewards (and jobs) is envisioned as a way 
to tackle the quality control and human capital problems of entrepreneurial regimes; the process is 
thought to both sort and develop leaders. Vendor competition aims to enhance the innovative 
forces of intrapreneuralism, while increasing the supply of new service providers. Increased 
schooling options are meant to address the problems of client responsiveness found in corporate 
regimes. Standardized measures of school effectiveness were intended to help parents select among 
the new schools and increase family commitments to the child’s school. In these ways and others, 
New York City aims to combine the best of the two market approaches. For principals, it creates 
many mixed accountability messages. 
 
Multiple Accountabilities 
Both the theoretical argument for empowerment and empirical research on school leaders 
suggest that principals do not simply react to such shifts in policy; they make strategic choices. 
These choices are subject to the limits of bounded rationality (Cyert & March, 1963; H. A. Simon, 
1957) and the internal structure of decision-making at any given school. As important, they reflect 
different types of accountability as school principals experience them (Firestone and Shipps, 2005; 
Leithwood, Louis, Anderson, & Wahlstrom, 2004).  
 
Table 3 
Multiple Accountabilities Framework
 
Type of Accountability! Associated 
Regime! Manifestation! Objectives! Operative Mechanisms!
 
Political responsiveness!  Empowerment!  Citizen/Group 
Pressure!  Citizen/Group Satisfaction!  Suppressing, Negotiating or  
Mobilizing 
External 
Resources!
Bureaucratic mandates 
      
      Process-based 
 
       
      Outcome-based!
 
 
 
 
Employment!
 
 
Regulations 
 
 
Standards and 
Consequences!
 
 
Consistent 
Processes  
 
Systemic 
Alignment !
 
 
Compliance 
 
 
Managing 
Resources and 
Coordinating 
Expectations!
 
Market incentives 
       
      Corporate 
 
      Entrepreneurial!
 
 
 
 
Market!
 
 
 
Intrapreneuralism 
 
Entrepreneurialism!
 
 
 
Innovation and 
Efficiency !
 
 
Internal 
Competition 
 
External 
Competition!
 
Professional discretion!  Performance!  Practical and 
Research 
Consensus!
 
Preferred Practice!  Coaching and 
Certifying!
 
Moral compunction!  None !  Espoused Beliefs!  Value Ethical 
Commitments!  Moral Persuasion or 
Ethical Reasoning!
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Accountability consists of demands for a demonstration of performance claims. As the 
discussion of governing regimes above suggests, it comes in multiple forms.  For example, 
accountability requires politicians to demonstrate that they have heard and addressed the needs of 
their constituents. Managerial employees show their bosses that they have used mandated processes 
to meet performance targets. Market-based entrepreneurs please their customers, or risk losing them 
to another provider. Lawyers demonstrate that they follow professionally accepted practice or risk 
ostracism and censure, while religious leaders are expected to live in conformance with the teachings 
of their faith (Shipps & White, 2009). Table 3 associates each of five accountability types with a 
governing regime and sketches how each type is expected to influence principal behavior.  
Principals face many of the five types of accountability at any given time, a claim that has 
been initially identified in typologies (Adams & Kirst, 1999; Darling-Hammond, 1989; Firestone & 
Riehl, 2005), independently substantiated by factor analysis of survey research—decision making by 
successful principals was found to have multiple components (Leithwood & Jantzi, 2008; Mulford, 
2008)—and by research examining principal’s interpretation of their own power and influence 
(Marks & Nance, 2007). 
Governance reform aims to reshuffle accountability obligations, promoting some types at 
the expense of others. However, it seldom eliminates pre-existing obligations. For example, New 
York City, like many other districts, expects principals to achieve bureaucratically targeted goals first, 
even if this means putting off other valued educational objectives (Linn, Baker, & Betebenner, 2002; 
Sleeter, 2007). Yet, the combination of open enrollment and the creation of hundreds of small high 
schools has also pitted principals against one another in competition for students whose prior 
performance predicts they can meet outcome expectations (Hemphill, Nauer, Zelon, & Jacobs, 
2009; New York City Department of Education, 2008a; Quint, Smith, Unterman, & Moedano, 
2010). In such a situation, principals may experience the mandate to meet high outcome targets as 
being in conflict with the market incentive to differentiate their school’s educational services from 
competitors. Add the principal’s awareness of parents clamoring for more voice in school policies 
(See for example, Commission on School Governance, 2008) and his or her decisions become, at 
least in theory, very complicated. Therefore, rather than assuming that accountability forces flow 
directly from regime design, this research asks open-ended questions about how principals 
experience accountability. 
The next section describes how New York City’s two empowerment policies—hundreds of 
new small open-enrollment high schools and a regulated market of school service providers—are 
intended to affect principals in the context of its high stakes diverse provider regime. Subsequent 
sections report the data analysis strategies and principals’ actual perceptions of accountability after 
the implementation of these two policies. Finally, I speculate about the policy implications for 
Diverse Provider Regimes. 
Intended Policy Consequences and Rationale 
Before clarifying the two policies examined in this paper, a word about the scope of high-
stakes accountability in New York City: By 2008, New York City principals were individually 
responsible for meeting outcome targets in two years, as measured by the school’s Progress Report. 
High school Progress Reports use several metrics. A community engagement measure reflects 
average student attendance (set at 5% of the total school score) and parent, student and teacher 
satisfaction ratings (10%). Student performance progress (25%) rates the school on its disaggregated 
graduation rates. A value-added measure of performance growth (60%) overweighs the pass-rates of 
struggling students on five state-mandated Regents (graduation) exams and their on-time credit 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 20 No. 1  
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accumulation.4 Principals were eligible to receive bonuses of up to $25,000 if their scores fell in the 
top 20%; they could lose their jobs if scores failed to meet targets (New York City Department of 
Education, 2008b). In the fall of 2008, 15 principals received the top prize, and another 71 received 
lesser bonuses (Hernandez, 2008a); one year later, 63 principals received bonuses of between $7,000 
and $25,000 (Otterman, 2009). Although “the year-to-year volatility of the Progress Report has 
undermined its credibility,” it is already a well-established yardstick for assessing principal 
performance (Hemphill et al., 2010, p.5).5 
 
Creating a Market of Small Schools 
Small high schools are defined as having 550 or fewer students, a cutoff used for several 
recent New York City studies (See for example, Bloom, Thompson, & Unterman, 2010). The small 
schools movement began years before Bloomberg’s tenure, driven by a logic of “less is more” in 
which low-performing youth were offered intimate, family-like school options and deeper inquiry 
into a smaller number of subjects (Sizer, 1984/2004, 1997). It was inspired by “social justice and 
democratic movements” (Klonsky & Klonsky, 2008, p.24).  Small schools were said to encourage 
adult cooperation and nurture students who needed individualized support (Ancess, 2003), especially 
when accompanied by intensely collaborative learning structures (Lee & Smith, 1994). Although 
small schools have problems—they are many times more likely to experience extreme volatility in 
their test scores than large schools, and can develop strained social relations over time (Hernandez, 
2008b; Kane & Staiger, 2002; Lee, Smerdon, Alfeld-Liro, & Brown, 2000)—by 1995-96, New York 
City had about 60 small schools and about 99 very large ones.  
Small high school openings were stepped up after Bloomberg took control in 2002, this time 
motivated by the logic of choice and competition. Progress Reports identified “failing” large high 
schools, which were phased out over three years while 4-8 small schools were located on the same 
campus (Independent Budget Office, January 25, 2010; Quint, Smith, Unterman, & Moedano, 2010). 
Each small school is responsible for offering a distinctive path to a common standard of high school 
graduation, a path that is strongly influenced by at least one external partnering organization. 
Students are expected to do better in schools they chose than in assigned schools, while school 
leaders are sensitized to market opportunities by competing for students.  
To facilitate the market for small schools, Mayor Bloomberg revamped the choice process 
by requiring each of the city’s 300,000 8th graders to apply for admittance to up twelve high schools, 
most receiving one offer in return (Abdulkadiroglu, Tathak, & Roth, 2005). Creating a new supply of 
small high schools was seen as a structural pre-condition for choice; it increased the number of high 
school options and therefore the possibilities each student might receive a preferred choice. By 
2004-05, this open-enrollment logic expanded the number of small high schools to about 160, 
alongside 121 large ones. Three years later, small high schools nearly doubled that of large ones, 205 
to 114,6 and educated about 18% of students (Quint, Smith, Unterman, & Moedano, 2010).  
 
 
                                                
4 In New York City, the high school standard is a New York State Regents diploma, which requires passing 
competency tests in math, English, U.S. history, global history and science and accumulating 44 course 
credits. 
5 For more information about New York City’s high stakes incentive system, see Shipps and White (2009) 
and (Hemphill et al., 2010; Hemphill, Nauer, Zelon, & Jacobs, 2009). 
6 These counts are somewhat greater than other reports (Bloom, Thompson, & Unterman, 2010). Our 
research protocol defined a high school as any school with grades 9-12, including middle school-high school 
combinations. 
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Creating a Market of School Support Organizations 
In January 2007, Mayor Bloomberg announced that all school principals would be required 
to purchase support services from one of eleven School Support Organizations, or SSOs. School 
discretionary budgets were increased by an average of about $170,000 to pay for these services. 
Principals’ SSO choices were to remain in effect for two years (New York City Department of 
Education, 2007a). Each SSO offered professional development, training in the use of the DOE’s 
tools for measuring performance, assistance with special education, English Language Learners 
(ELLs), and the school’s worst performing students. SSOs were supported by a district-wide data 
analysis system intended to help them target school service needs, but the DOE no longer provided 
such services directly to schools. In 2010, the DOE consolidated the number of authorized SSO 
entities from eleven to five, but the underlying rationale remains the same. See (Hemphill et al., 
2010, p.14).  
The DOE’s rationale followed an argument made by analysts endorsing a change from a 
“school system” to a “system of schools” (Hill, Foster, & Glendler, 1990), which is loosely based on 
the model of the multi-divisional corporation (Ouchi & Segal, 2003). The district would no longer 
set norms for teaching processes, but would remain the standard-setter, data gatherer, and evaluator 
of school progress. Chancellor Klein claimed that by creating a market of SSOs, “We are 
transforming a school system based on compliance and top-down decision-making to one that 
empowers principals to make key decisions about what’s best for students and their school 
communities” (New York City Department of Education, 2007a, p.1). By April of 2007 the district 
had created five SSO options. The city’s non-profit education sector added another six.7  
 
Table 4 
School Support Organizations 
 
School Support 
Organization! Number of Affiliated 
Schools in 
2007/2009a!
Percent of 
Schools 
2007/2009! Enrollment Range! Number of High Schools 
2007b!
Costs per School 
2007!
Empowerment Support 
Organization (ESO)!  500/526!  35%/36%  45-4539 !  146  $29,500 (less rebates)!
Learning Support 
Organizations (LSOs): 
      
Integrated Curriculum & 
Instruction LSO 
 
Community LSO 
 
      
Leadership LSO 
    
Knowledge LSO!
 
 
 
 
373/353 
 
 
167/156 
 
 
116/136 
 
97/93!
 
 
 
 
20%/24% 
 
 
12%/11% 
 
 
8%/9% 
 
7%/6% 
 
 
 
 
333-4538 
 
 
160-3790 
 
 
109-4391 
 
342-3712!
 
 
 
 
57 
 
 
38 
 
 
25 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
$47,500 (less 
$9,000 rebate) 
 
$33,750, $39,850 or 
$66,675 
 
$49,500 
 
$42,438!
                                                
7 The nonprofit sector created another that did not attract the minimum of ten schools. The sponsoring 
agencies for these networks were The American Institute for Research, Learning Innovations at WestEd, and Success 
for All Foundation. 
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Partnership Support 
Organizations (PSOs): 
 
New Visions PSO 
 
Center for Education 
Leadership-Public 
Education Association 
PSO 
 
City University of New 
York PSO 
 
Fordham University PSO 
 
 
Academy for Education 
Development PSO 
       
 
Replications Inc. PSO!
 
 
 
 
63/76 
 
 
53/77 
 
 
12/18 
 
 
10/16 
 
 
 
10/10 
 
 
9/13!
 
 
 
 
4%/5% 
 
 
4%/5% 
 
 
<1%/1% 
 
 
<1%/1% 
 
 
 
<1%/<1% 
 
 
<1%/<1% 
 
 
 
 
106-3442 
 
 
78-2717 
 
 
483-883 
 
 
269-1432 
 
 
 
386-1068 
 
 
79-501!
 
 
 
 
45 
 
 
4 
 
 
7 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
$36,616, or $62,733 
for large high 
schools 
 
43,000 to $79,000 
 
 
$49,468 to $57,519  
 
 
$46,000 
 
 
 
unknown 
 
 
unknown!
Total/Average! 1411/1474! 100%/100%! ! 344 $33,533-$48,090!
a Total in 2009 includes schools closed and new schools opened between 2007-09 with shifts in SSO choices 
in 2009. 
b Data retrieved from Advocates for Children of New York. Insideschools.org, July 2007. 
http://www.insideschools.org/. Used Excel file: SSO+Match++schools+5.2007. Verified 9/25/07. 
 
Each SSO was asked to differentiate its services. As Table 4 suggests, SSOs came in three 
distinct types. The ESO was based on the premise that principals know best what services they need. 
ESO principals organized themselves into 22 networks of 10-27 schools and purchased the services 
of a shared, 5-person team: network team leader or general manager, business manager, achievement 
coach, instructional specialist, special services manager. All other services were purchased on the 
open market. The ESO charged the least for its services, gave some rebates and grew slightly in two 
years. In 2010, the DOE significantly expanded this model of SSO by mandating that most 
principals self-select into ESO-like networks, renamed Children First Networks.8 
Yet many principals wanted outside assistance in identifying critical needs, practical help with 
special populations, and ready-made professional development. Consequently, in 2007 the district 
asked four superintendents to each develop a Learning Support Organization (LSO). The Integrated 
Curriculum and Instruction (ICI) LSO stressed differentiated and customized support to prepare 
students for the 21st-Century global economy and attracting many large high school principals. The 
Community LSO emphasized school-family-community interactions and the notion that schools 
were community resources. The Leadership LSO self-consciously focused on developing leadership 
skills across the staff. The Knowledge Network LSO offered a “content-rich” common core 
                                                
8 Except for those principals who were already associated with a PSO, they were required to rank their 
preferences from among approximately 60 ESO-like “networks” of about 25 schools, with all the principals 
in each network required to purchase the same service providers. The NYC DOE characterized the change as 
an expansion of the ESO model. 
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curriculum.9 In 2010, the district consolidated these four options in favor of a greater number of 
self-selected and self-sufficient “networks” under the ESO formula. Our research reflects these four 
LSO options, in existence when the interviews were conducted. 
The third category of SSOs was the non-district Partnership Support Organizations (PSOs) 
developed and approved through an RFP process. They brought unique resources (e.g., a specialized 
curriculum, a model of coaching, access to university professors and courses) to a small group of 
schools. The largest of the sponsoring organizations was the foundation-supported New Visions for 
Public Schools, which has long championed small high schools. Many of the new small school 
principals chose NVPSO as their SSO, accounting for much of the growth. Other privatized options 
included the Fordham and City (CUNY) Universities in New York City and the city’s Public 
Education Association (CED-PEA). Two non-profits with for-profit affiliates also made the cut.10 
These external partnering organizations were retained in 2010 since they had district contracts.  
This new market of internal and external SSOs was expected to spur school-level innovation. Yet 
LSOs were undeveloped and PSOs were not approved until six weeks before selections were made. 
Consequently, principals reported choosing an SSO that was staffed by people they already knew, or 
knew of. Principal Eliot explained, “We chose [our SSO] because [of]…relationships that I’ve 
developed over the five years as principal…Those are the same people I knew before and the same 
people I’ll continue to pick up the phone to call if I have an issue or a question.” Principal 
Swinburne, a first-year principal concurred, “I inherited [my] network. I landed here the day the 
school opened. I had no idea I was going to be here…but let me be very, very careful – clear—
about this.  If I had to choose my [network], it would have been those exact same…people.” 
Principal Bronte concurred, although he was unclear about whether another might be better: “I 
think I know what I want for my school.  I think in my early years, I basically have been stuck with 
the same people who were [in] my regional support system, and I think in many years I learned a lot 
from them, and I think I did rely on them.  I think I rely on them less now because I think I’m 
more, I more have an idea of what I want and what I think needs to be done.” Under such 
circumstances, it is not surprising that during the second open-enrollment period in spring of 2009, 
less than 6% of schools (88 of 1474) recorded a new choice of SSO.  
Therefore, this analysis characterizes the SSO choice as a reflection of principal 
predisposition and experience, rather than an exogenous causal influence. Like administrator 
experience, SSO choice was expected to influence how principals conceptualize their decisions only 
to the extent that it reflected some aspect of their prior professional experience. Because of this self-
selection, it was anticipated that principals in different SSOs would respond to district-wide 
accountability pressures in distinct ways, which would be revealed in patterned responses.  
 
Research Methods 
The 18 randomly selected principals whose lengthy (avg.=1.5 hours) structured interviews 
analyzed here took place in winter and spring of 2007-08, following implementation of the two 
                                                
9 SSO products and services varied too. For example, the ICILSO aimed to develop schools as pathways for 
academic and economic success by tapping into the latest brain and developmental research and by focusing 
on meta-level skills like critical thinking, synthesizing and analysis. To accomplish this, ICILSO affiliated with 
14 external providers of professional development including Harvard’s “American’s Choice” and offered 
professional development courses like “Mendelian Genetics,” “DNA Transformation and Protein Isolation,” 
“Developing Mathematical Ideas,” and “Mathematical Patterns and Functions,” all of which aim to enhance 
the content knowledge of teachers in large comprehensive high schools.  
10 In 2007, PSOs’ active solicitation of schools was limited to those with which they had developed a prior 
relationship. 
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market-creation policies described above.11 Informants were stratified to include equal numbers of 
principals from each of the six SSOs chosen by at least ten high school principals (i.e., ESO, 
ICILSO, CLSO, LLSO, KNLSO, and NVPSO). They were also stratified to ensure equal numbers 
of large and small school principals.12 Permission to enter the schools was secured using required 
college and DOE institutional review processes. All interviews were conducted confidentially; names 
used are fictitious and some descriptive data is omitted in Table 5 to preserve anonymity.  
All interviews followed a semi-structured protocol developed by the author and two 
colleagues (Razik, 2006; White, 2006), which adapted critical incident technique (Flanagan, 1954). 
CIT has proven useful for identifying actors’ perceptions about the behaviors critical to their own 
performance in environments where individual discretion is high and decisions have serious 
consequences (Chell, 1998). The lengthy interviews consisted of seven open-ended questions 
structured to elicit incidents crucial to each principal’s experience of accountability, resulting in a 
total of 241 incidents. Principals were asked to provide an explanatory example, or typical story, 
about each type of the five types of accountability identified in Table 3. Multiple probes ensured that 
incidents were described in detail (e.g., Did you consult with anyone? What was their advice? How 
did you finally decide?). Although solicited by questions identifying a particular type of 
accountability, incidents did not always conform to the type sought. Nor did principals limit 
themselves to one incident for each type of accountability. The average number of incidents per 
informant was 13.4. Interviews were tape-recorded, transcribed and qualitatively coded Using NVivo 
8.0.  A large subset (14%) was complex, and nearly 4% created one-off codes (See Reducing Critical 
Incidents below). Coded incidents were correlated with five explanatory variables and chi-squares 
were conducted on grouped variable counts to identify patterns using PASWStatistics 18.0  (See 
Analysis below).13  
As table 5 shows, a large proportion of the principals interviewed proved transient. Five 
principals left the job within two years, nearly a 30% transiency rate. Those with the highest 
transiency rate led small schools with relatively high achieving students (75%) although they had the 
same average tenure at interview as all other principals (4.5 years). This pattern reflects a recognized 
trend in the contemporary era (Gootman, 2006), and suggests a combination of reasons. Other 
research on New York City has found that small high school principals leave early in their careers 
from burnout (Hemphill, Nauer, Zelon, & Jacobs, 2009). Floundering principals sometimes point to 
the lack of opportunity to learn from their local counterparts precisely because their support 
networks are not geographically based, while accountability tools based on gain scores are quick to 
reward  (and punish) low-achieving schools (Hemphill et al., 2010). Our findings shed some 
additional light on this transiency (See Policy Implications below).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
11 Informants were offered a $50.00 gift certificate for their school as an incentive to participate. An initial 
response rate of 50% required that the random selection process be repeated. Three “slots” required only one 
new draw, three required a second redraw, one required three redraws. The last slot (late in the school year) 
required 6 redraws.  
12 The population excluded schools with examination or audition entrance criteria (n=9), GED-only 
programs, and schools assigned to incarcerated students. 
13 For more detail on the interviews and protocol see Shipps and White (2009). 
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Table 5 
Description of the Sample 
 
Pseudonym School Size 
Category 
SSO Principal 
Experience 
Code 
Peer Index 
Quartile 
Diversity 
Index 
Code 
New 
Principal 
in 2009? 
Shelly Small NVPSO Early Bottom Moderate No 
Hemingway Small NVPSO Early 3rd High Yes 
Morrison Small NVPSO Experienced 3rd Low Yes 
Ishiguru Small LLSO Early Bottom Moderate No 
Tennyson Small LLSO Experienced Bottom Moderate No 
Cather Small LLSO Experienced 2nd Moderate No 
Tan Small ESO Experienced 3rd High No 
Proust Small ESO Early 3rd Low Yes 
Steinbeck Small KNLSO Early 2nd Low No 
Swinburne Large IC&ILSO Early 2nd High No 
Salinger Large IC&ILSO Early 2nd Moderate No 
Eliot Large IC&ILSO Experienced 2nd High Yes 
Oates Large CLSO Early 3rd High No 
Murdoch Large CLSO Experienced 3rd High No 
Ellison Large CLSO Experienced 3rd High No 
Angelou Large ESO Early Bottom Moderate Yes 
Bronte Large KNLSO Experienced 3rd Low No 
Marquez Large KNLSO Experienced 2nd High No 
 
Critical Incidents   
An incident is a description of a decision situation in which the principal was required to act. 
It is typically related as a story, with a beginning, middle, and end, heroes and villains. Alternatively, 
it was told as an argument explaining why a principal’s view of causes and consequences led to her 
response. A critical incident is any situation involving a principal decision that, in hindsight, seemed 
consequential to her leadership and the school’s performance. An incident took, on average, seven 
minutes to relate, and most involved responses to several probing questions.  
 
Reducing Critical Incidents  
All critical incidents were coded according to the two essential dimensions. The first was 
drawn from the multiple accountabilities framework in Table 3: the type of accountability 
experienced—bureaucratic, political, professional, market, or moral. For example, a critical incident 
the principal characterized as a demand from parents requiring him to suppress, negotiate or 
mobilize external resources was coded as a “political” incident. An incident characterized by the 
principal as requiring mandated compliance to a particular DOE rule or outcome target was coded 
“bureaucratic.” When a principal spoke about a decision situation where she was in competition 
with another school, requiring her to be innovative to gain a competitive advantage, it was coded as 
“market”, and so on.  
The second essential dimension of a critical incident is the relationship between accountability 
types when more than one is mentioned.14 The principal’s assertion of a single accountability type, 
requiring little deliberation, was coded as “simple.” The characterization of the critical incident as 
                                                
14 My thanks to Monica White who first brought the relationship component to my attention.  
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requiring a choice between two conflicting accountability types, each encouraging a different 
decision, was coded as “conflicted.” Two or more accountability types that reinforced one another 
in a single incident, leading to an over-determined response, was coded as “aligned.” Three 
accountability types in a complex relationship of conflict and support, in which the principal 
reported balancing many interests and alliances was coded as “complex.”  
Thus, each incident could be coded as a combination of its accountability type and 
relationship, a process that created 30 distinct incident codes. Because critical incidents were most 
often described as reflections of multiple accountability types, either because several forces were 
perceived to be in conflict or reinforcing one another, our counts of accountability codes are 
weighted.15 
The most common incident involved conflict between the principal’s professional judgment 
and how she understood the district’s rules.  For example, if in the professional judgment of the 
principal, a chronically failing and truant student required access to a different type of school, but 
the district’s procedural rules required that the school continue to serve the student, her recounting 
might describe a clash between two types of accountability—professional accountability and 
bureaucratic accountability. In Table 6 this incident would be coded as bur vs. prof, which includes 
both the types of accountability mentioned and the conflicted relationship between them. This 
accountability coding was near ubiquitous; only one first-year principal failed to report any such 
incident. Indeed, other research suggests that most principals routinely make difficult judgment calls 
about whether, when, and how to follow their professional training and instincts, and when to abide 
by the rules (Firestone & Rhiel, 2005). But the findings of this study go beyond this most common 
type of accountability conflict by mapping the range of incidents critical to principal accountability 
in New York City.  
To take another example, a different principal might describe the same two influences 
described above— the principal’s professional judgment about who can best serve a student and the 
district’s rules about continuing students—as supporting one another, because the principal felt his 
school was a good fit, and he bolstered his pedagogical arguments by referring to district policy. In 
this case, the incident would be coded as bureaucratic supports professional (bur supp prof). Table 6 shows 
all 30 distinct accountability codes that the reduction process produced.  
                                                
 
15 Incidents that were coded as examples of uncontested single accountabilities are weighted 1. When two 
accountabilities were described as conflicting or aligned, each is weighted .5. Three accountabilities are each 
weighted .33. All analyses were also conducted without weights, with few resulting differences. 
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Inter-rater reliability for incident coding was assured by asking an experienced colleague to 
code a randomly chosen subset of the 241 critical incidents. The author and colleague initially 
achieved 75% agreement, a Cohen’s Kappa of .41, and “moderate” consensus according to Stemler 
(2001).  
 
Table 6 
Critical Incidents by Principal 
 
 
 
Incident Types 
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bur vs. prof 2 2 3 1 4 0 2 4 3 4 3 4 4 1 2 3 5 2 49 
bur supports prof 0 3 0 0 3 0 2 2 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 0 22 
market 0 1 2 1 0 2 0 1 0 1 1 3 0 2 1 0 1 1 17 
bureaucratic 1 1 4 1 2 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 16 
pol supports prof 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 1 0 1 2 2 1 0 1 3 16 
professional 2 2 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 2 1 1 0 0 15 
political 0 1 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 13 
bur vs. mor 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 12 
prof vs. pol 1 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 11 
bur vs. prof vs. pol 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 7 
mark supports prof 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 7 
bur vs. prof supports 
pol 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 
bur vs. pol 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 
mor supports prof 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 6 
bur vs. mark 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 
prof vs. mark 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
pol vs. prof supports 
bur 
0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 5 
bur vs. mor supports 
prof 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 
moral  1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
prof vs. bur supports 
mark 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
bur vs. personal 
needs 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
prof vs. mor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
pol vs. mark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
pol vs. mor 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
pol supports mor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
bur supports prof 
supports mor 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
pol supports mark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
bur vs. mor supports 
mark 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
pol vs. prof supports 
mor 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
mor supports bur 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Totals 1
1 
1
3 
1
7 
1
4 
1
4 
1
3 
1
0 
1
4 
1
3 
1
6 
1
2 
1
7 
1
1 
1
4 
1
3 
1
1 
1
6 
1
2 
2 
4 
1 
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Analysis 
Analysis omitted the nine one-off accountability codes at the bottom of Table 6. Counts of 
the top 21 accountability codes (each reflecting two or more incidents) were correlated with five 
variables. Two variables estimated the market creation policies being examined—school size and 
choice of support network. Three variables estimated either the principal’s leadership experience 
(i.e., years of principal experience) or the school’s educational challenge (i.e., school diversity index, 
school index of student performance or “peer” index). As briefly described below, the three non-
policy variables estimate conditions that literature suggests should have an independent influence on 
principal decision-making.  
Only those incidents whose count led to significant correlations with either of the two policy 
variables or the three non-policy variables are pursued in depth. For these incidents, patterns were 
sought in content (e.g., teacher selection, parental complaints, mandated accountability tools) and 
principal tone (e.g. confident, frustrated, puzzled). The patterns help explain why the correlations 
and chi square findings are significant, but also how they are consistent. 
In addition to correlations, incident counts were aggregated separately by accountability type 
and accountability relationship to determine if either dimension was separately significant in 
understanding variation. Chi-square tests of significance were conducted to evaluate the null 
hypothesis of no association between each of five variables and the two aggregated incident 
dimensions. Due to the relatively small sample size, all variables were categorized and non-
parametric tests of significance were used.16  Below are brief descriptions of the three non-policy 
context variables.  
 Experience. Common sense and some research suggest that a principal’s years on the job is 
related to decision-making (Hamilton, Ross, Steinbach, & Leithwood, 1996; Leithwood, Steinbach, 
& Begley, 1992). On-the-job experience is expected to affect the mental models that leaders bring to 
organizing the school and to be highly dependant on the situational contexts. As Kenneth 
Leithwood and colleagues put it: “Like tools, concepts can only be fully understood through 
experience with their use and the refined appreciations (including tacit knowledge) that occur as a 
result of feedback from such use” (Leithwood, Louis, Anderson, & Wahlstrom, 2004, p.69) The 
relationship between experience and success may not be linear, however. For example, one study 
found that more job experience was positively correlated with principals’ use of less-efficacious, 
external forms of power (i.e., coercion, rewards, and hierarchical authority), while the internal forms 
of power associated with effective schools (expertise and referent power) were more commonly 
used by principals with less experience (Lyons & Murphy, April 8, 1994). Our study categorized the 
number of years as a principal into two groups, and found significant correlations and qualitative 
differences between early career and experienced principals’ reactions to New York City’s high 
stakes accountability. 
Prior performance. Prior student achievement is a significant predictor of school 
performance that justifies many reform efforts (See for example, McDermott, 2003). New York City 
asserts that its measure of prior student performance, the Peer Index, is the best predictor of future 
student performance because it provides a baseline for judging schools on a growth model (New 
York City Department of Education, 2007b; Roderick, Jacob, & Bryk, 2002). The Peer Index also 
acknowledges that principals of schools with high proportions of low-achieving students (i.e., low 
peer index) face a more difficult graduation rate challenge than those whose incoming students have 
                                                
16 The Diversity Index was categorized from high (.7-1.0), to moderate (.4-.6), and low (0-.3). The Peer Index 
schools in this sample were put in the quartile they represented, using the district range. For principal tenure, 
1-4 years was categorized as an early career principal, while 5 or 6 years was categorized as an experienced 
principal. 
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higher test scores. It is a weighted average of the students’ 8th grade English-Language Arts and 
math exam rankings that range from 1 to 4.5.  The higher the number, the higher scoring the 
school’s entering students.17 Our study adopted the Peer Index as one of two measures of the 
school’s educational challenge. It was assumed that a principal’s perceptions of accountability would 
vary based on the Peer Index of the school. Both significant correlations and qualitative differences 
were found.  
Diversity. It is a truism that the educational task is more difficult in highly diverse schools 
than in predominantly white schools (Jencks & Phillips, 1998; Teddlie, Stringfield, & Reynolds, 
2000). The diversity index used in this study is RAND’s school race/ethnicity diversity index, 
standardized on a 0-1 scale: “the probability that two members [students] of the [school] population 
chosen at random will be of different subpopulations” (White quoted in Gates et al., 2003, p.75).18 
This variable allows for examination of differences in principals’ views of accountability based on 
student, our second measure of educational challenge. In our sample, the diversity index is also 
inversely correlated with the percentage of black students (-.870, p =.01) reflecting New York City’s 
complex racial segregation. In RAND’s study of national survey data, diversity values above .7 were 
associated with a marked increase in principals’ perceptions of poverty-related instructional 
problems and conflict among parents and community members (p. 123). Despite expectations that 
we might find similar results, no significant correlation between the diversity index (or its inverse, 
percent black) and any incident codes was found. As intriguing as we found the lack of statistical 
significance, this article does not pursue it further. 
 
Methodological Limitations 
Correlation and chi square analyses were used to identify the particular subset of incidents 
where it would be fruitful to examine differences in content and tone. Qualitative analysis helped 
explain why the differences occurred and how principals experienced them. Although triangulating 
results between quantitative and qualitative analysis improves reliability, there are also limitations in 
this methodological approach.  
One limitation is selection bias involved in seeking volunteers for in-depth interviews. To 
test the hypotheses that differences by school size, student diversity, incoming student performance, 
principal experience or gender might have influenced the number of randomized redraws required 
to identify 18 willing participants, and hence the sample’s reliability, we correlated all these variables. 
Only the timing of the interview request had a statistically significant correlation with the number of 
random redraws required to find a willing participant. Later in the school year was more difficult to 
schedule. Nevertheless, it may be that these randomly chosen 18 principals are unrepresentative of 
the larger group of New York City high school principals in some untested way.  
Another limitation involves the large amount of data collected when using CIT. Because 
multiple incidents are sought, and none rejected, voluble principals may have disproportionate 
impact on the results. Reporting the proportion of the identically coded incidents in the findings 
section mitigates this possibility. In addition, all one-off incidents were excluded from analysis, 
focusing the qualitative analysis on patterns rather than outliers. 
A third limitation of using CIT is its reliance on self-reports. We do not know whether 
principals’ reports accurately reflect what they did. The principal’s self-report does not exhaust other 
perspectives on the same situation. Nor are their accounts reliable statements of what it takes to 
                                                
17 The mean Peer Index score for all 238 high schools that were rated in 2006-07 was 2.73, the median index 
score is 2.64, the lowest score was 2.04, and the highest was 4.06. 
18 A value of zero indicates complete homogeneity; all students are of one racial or ethnic group. A value of 
one means complete heterogeneity; all groups are represented equally. 
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improve school performance. Leaders may feel certain that a particular decision had a self-evident, 
universal impetus, or that change in their working environment obviously shifted the consequences 
they faced, even when their intentions and/or shifted incentives did not have a causal relationship to 
outcomes. Instead, this choice of interview technique is intended to capture how principals make sense of 
and decide to act upon their accountability by eliciting the stories that they tell to justify, explain or 
rationalize their behavior (D. Stone, 1998). 
 
Key Findings 
While our research must be considered suggestive because the sample is relatively small, the 
findings are internally consistent and help illuminate how high school principals react to the 
complicated accountability environments found in Diverse Provider Regimes. The results of 
correlation and chi square analyses show that both policy and non-policy variables were 
systematically related to principals’ views of accountability.   
The main finding concerns the interaction of the two market-creating policies. Large school 
principals (n=9) relied significantly more on outside political resources to support their professional 
decisions than did small school principals (n=9). This pattern became more nuanced, when incidents 
were grouped for chi square analysis. Six principals, one third of the sample, drove much of the 
observed difference. They reported less conflict and evinced more confidence in their decisions than 
did the twelve principals who chose the other four SSOs. The six had each chosen one of two SSOs, 
NVPSO or ICILSO. NVSPO specialized in working with small high school principals (n=3), while 
ICILSO specialized in working with large high school principals (n=3). This evidence suggests that 
the choice of SSO was sometimes influenced by the school’s size through the mechanism of SSO 
specialization and market segmentation. 
Close analysis of the incidents in question revealed that their perceptions of accountability 
coherence and feelings of confidence came about for different reasons depending on whether the 
principal headed a small or a large school. Principals leading large schools reported less conflict 
because they experienced a great deal of alignment in their accountability environments: Political, 
moral, and market accountability all reinforced their professional judgments more than was typical. 
Principals leading small schools reported less conflict in their accountability environments because 
they felt each type of accountability stood alone, uncontested and uncomplicated by rival claims. 
Below I further explain the significant correlations in Table 7, and the significant chi-square in Table 
8 by analyzing the content and tone of the incidents involved.  
 
Table 7 
Correlations between Critical Incident Types and Five Explanatory Variables 
 
Critical Incident Types! School 
Size! Principal SSO 
Choice a! Principal Experience! School Peer Index! School Diversity Index!
bur vs. prof! !"#$%! &"#'(! ")*'! "'#+!,! &"#%-!
bur supports prof! !"#*)! &"#)$! !!!!"*#.!,,! ".-*! &"#'(!
market! !")(+! "-.%! &"(-$! &")*%! !")%%!
bureaucratic! &")(.! ")'%! &")$'! &")(+! &"#*#!
pol supports prof! !"'-*!,! &"(..! &"#'(! ".$)! !"-)'!
professional! !".*#! &".#*! ")##! "#'+! !"#*)!
political ! &"(.+! ")(.! &"-(%! &")'$! !"#'$!
bur vs. mor! &".))! &"#-+! "#*-! &".$)! !".%(!
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prof vs. pol! !".$.! &"#*#! ")+#! &"#-'! &"#$)!
bur vs. prof vs. pol! !"#($! &"(#.! "#.*! "'.#!,! !"(+.!
mar supports prof! !"(()! &"#))! &"#''! "()(! &"##.!
bur vs. prof supports pol! &"(.*! &".+$! !!&"-+$!,! &"(+(! !"##*!
bur vs. pol! &".-)! "#)#! &".$$! &"(%$! !"#()!
mor supports prof! !"(($! &"##-! &".'#! ".()! !"#%*!
bur vs. mark! !"###! &"(+'! "##-! &"#*.! &".$.!
prof vs. mark! &"().! "(.)! &"#%%! "#-'! &")#(!
pol vs. prof supports bur! !"..$! &"#+(! &"($(! !!&"-*$!,! !".*+!
bur vs. mor supports prof! &"#($! &")%.! ".(%! ")-.! !"#++!
moral -.356 -.078 -.139 .031 -.026 
prof vs. bur supports mark -.254 .131 .282 .049 -.294 
bur vs. personal needs -.185 .207 -.092 .026 -.317 
a SSO choice tested using Spearman’s Rho ; * p<.05, ** p<.01 
Note: All one-off codes are excluded from this analysis 
 
Table 8  
Chi Square Tests of Independence Between Five Explanatory Variables and Two Dimensions of Accountability 
 
Five Explanatory Variables Types of Accountability  
(R 2) 
Weighted a 
Relationships  
Among Accountabilities 
(R 2) 
School Size 1.693  
(df=4, p=.792) 
7.080 
(df=3, p=.069) 
Principal SSO Choice 8.742  
(df=20, p=.986) 
26.586 * 
(df=15, P=.032)  
Principal Experience 3.308 
(df=4, p=.508) 
5.168 
(df=3, p=.160) 
School Peer Index 1.192 
(df=8, p=.997) 
5.731 
(df=6, p=.454) 
School Diversity Index 2.881 
(df=8, p=.942) 
6.339 
(df=6, p=.386) 
a Unweighted types produce similar results; * p<.05 
The Interactive Effects of School Size and SSO Choice on Accountability 
Small high school principals appear to lack a resource that many large high school principals 
have in relative abundance: the support of community and political leaders. Large school principals 
voiced many more incidents in which outside organizations—politicians or community-based 
organizations—supported their professionalism, sometimes providing the ballast to withstand other 
opposing community forces (.547, p =. 05). The many programs large school principals offer, their 
relatively deep history as neighborhood institutions, and the diversity of their external constituencies 
are all reasons they reached out for support. Principals of large schools sometimes even expressed a 
comradeship with local politicians. 
Half of the incidents in which political resources supported professional goals referred to 
community-based organizations or government agencies (4 incidents from 4 principals). For 
example, Principal Salinger told us that community-based organizations came to her aid when she 
experienced parental pushback over student internships. Parents complained that “I work, I don’t 
get off till 4:30-5:00.  I’m concerned that my child is now getting out of school a little bit earlier [to 
commute to an internship site].  These are mean, evil streets.  My child will be even home alone a 
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little bit longer now if say, for instance, my child doesn’t go to the internship or doesn’t have [an 
internship] program on that particular day.” So Salinger asked her partnering organizations for 
flexibility: ask “Could you start your program a little bit earlier on a Tuesday?” Uniformly, the reply 
she heard was “Sure, what do you want?” Pleased and also a bit surprised she surmised;  “The 
community [groups] worked with me because they knew what I was trying to achieve on many 
levels. I have such a good relationship with all my partners [such] that no one said, you know, ‘what 
are you doing?  You know, why are you messing up the schedule?” Moreover, she often “reached 
out” to them. Then she explained why she thought this didn’t always happen for principals of small 
high schools: “It is hard work; it’s a lot of meetings.  It’s a lot of networking; it’s a lot of begging. 
‘Please?  Can you?’”  The time needed for this intensive community engagement was justified for the 
leader of a big high school serving thousands of nearby students, less so for the leader of a small 
school serving a few hundred students drawn from across the city. 
Most other incidents of external support for the principal’s professional goals referenced 
local politicians (38%, 3 incidents from 3 principals). Principal Ellison reflected on the day that 
“[My city councilman] had come in to introduce himself,” mentioning that he was a former 
student. “There was just something so likeable and honest about him that we established a 
relationship [right] off the bat… I had a particular problem several years ago, when I first became a 
principal. I felt that it would have been a hindrance to my appointment here… I went to someone 
I felt I could trust, because he had a vested interest…I went to somebody I felt could help me. 
And he did. [Our] conversations, then went from the councilman to people at the district office to 
express his concerns about what was going on.”  Principal Ellison concluded: “I don't know if I 
could have [resolved the situation] without his support and his assistance.”  
Principal Marquez also described the importance of politicians’ assistance to large schools 
with many disparate needs and deep community roots. She further explained that the favors were 
reciprocal. “I also have testified in front of the borough president, and they both have been my 
guest speakers… I have testified in front of the city council… the politicians recognize the need, 
and besides, they are all really, really nice people. [Politicians] are all interested in the 
community…They are my strongest supporters” (Emphasis in original). Far fewer small school 
principals reported external political support for their professional judgments, and none specifically 
referenced the support of politicians. Recent analysis has suggested that successful superintendents 
manage upwards to the school board and orchestrate a network of external actors that control key 
resources (Meier, 2003; Meier & O'Toole, 2001). When their authority is enhanced, orchestrating 
external organizations and partners may be as important to principals of large high schools as 
managing relationships with board members and community leaders is to superintendents. 
Chi square analyses also revealed distinctions between accountability environments as 
experienced by SSO choice, which complicates these small and large school principal differences. 
Principals affiliated with the NVPSO—all leaders of small schools—and those affiliated with ICILSO—
all leaders of large schools—told fewer stories of conflict than would be predicted. Examining all of the 
non-conflict incidents from these six principals revealed two distinct patterns: ICILSO principals 
reported large proportions of the incidents in which market accountability, political, and moral 
accountability supported their professional judgments. NVPSO principals identified the largest 
proportion of single—unconflicted and unaligned—accountability incidents. For NVPSO principals, 
accountability was made up of a series of largely uncontested and straightforward decisions, each of 
which reflected a single source of influence. It was their job to meet these disparate demands, or at 
least appear to do so.  
Like most large school principals, those in the ICILSO relied on political support as 
described above. ICILSO principals also reported 50% of the incidents (3 incidents from 2 
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principals) in which their own sense of moral accountability supported their professional judgments. 
Principal Salinger described a common view of this alignment when she spoke of her commitment 
to small classes.  
My moral accountability is [summarized as] the least amount of kids that I can put in 
a class., as much as I can afford it and can do it. I get very agitated when I have to 
have more than 28 kids in the class, personally, as the principal. There have been 
times when I’ve had to go over [that number]. There are times when I’ve had to give 
a teacher 34 kids and I go to that teacher and say, ‘I’m going to do everything that I 
possibly can to reduce the numbers in your class. Please bear with me; it may be like 
this for a week or two until I can figure out the numbers.’  And they’re like, ‘Okay, 
[Principal Salinger] because we know that just because you can you don’t pack out 
classes.’  
She was well aware that her ethical commitment helped students indirectly, by improving teachers’ 
professional lives. “Because you want teachers to be able to get that hands-on experience with [each] 
child, to sit and help, and go and circulate [in] the classroom.  How can you do that with 34 kids in a 
class?...Sure, you can get away with it. It couldn’t be grieved [by the union]. But morally is this what’s 
right for kids? No, it’s not.” 
Alignment came too from ICILSO principals’ embrace of competition as an adjunct to their 
professional judgments (29%, 2 incidents from 2 principals). Principal Eliot conveyed it this way: 
“When I talk with parents, I’ll bring up…the three other [competing] schools I really focus on. So I 
always print our [Progress Report] and those three schools’ [Progress Reports], and 90% of the time 
we’re better in every category. So that’s why I’m happy to show it to all the constituencies and talk 
about it with all the constituencies… we scored higher than [one of the city’s selective schools] 
did…They made a big issue of it because they didn’t do that well and so I made sure I posted that 
article.” He spoke of parents as constituents in recognition that his role was political, but public 
relations was also instrumental to his professional credibility. He actively constructed the public 
perception of a strategic market advantage over his school’s main competition. 
Principal Swinburne also spoke at length about how competition for students was a key activity that 
engaged school leaders and discover his school’s competitive advantage. “It's a competitive market 
right now. And really we have to make Jamaica as saleable or more saleable than some of the other 
choices that [parents] were making… What it is right now is just a matter of making this school as 
attractive for those parents and those kids as some of the [small] schools that they've been diverted 
away to” But this was not in conflict with his sense of professionalism, and he found a number of 
ways to align the two: 
I'm working with my feeder schools… We have regular dialogues.  My kids go to 
their schools, and we do push-ins with the kids about the high school experience. 
And they do a little bit of PR for [Swinburne] High School.  We're doing some bridge 
collaboratives through the summer with their eighth graders coming to us… I'm 
looking at being able to offer programs, academies, smaller learning communities, 
within the school program here that are thematic in such a way that we'll draw kids, 
because this is a area of interest, and the school next door, down the block, or 
somewhere else in [our area], is not offering it. 
 
NVPSO principals appeared empowered in a different way. Compared to the principals 
choosing other SSOs, they more often identified bureaucratic, market, and political accountability as 
separate, independent influences on their decision-making. They mentioned 63% of all the incidents 
(n=10) in which uncontested bureaucratic accountability drove principal’s decisions. Two of them 
mentioned 46% of the incidents uncontested political accountability (n=6), as well as 24% of the 
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incidents (n=4) in which uncontested market accountability was the only influence they experienced. 
Although each of these 20 incidents involved a problem requiring an executive decision, they were 
recounted as uncomplicated ones, usually resolved by the principal’s unilateral action, occasionally 
through collaboration with, at most, one organization. NVPSO principals were also among the most 
self-satisfied. 
 NVPSO principals typically related uncontested bureaucratic obligations as if their sole 
responsibility was to implement district regulations within the limits of the school’s resources. For 
example, Principal Morrison responded to the district requirement that his small school meet 
specific graduation rate targets by personally recording every student’s attempt at a Regents 
examination and the highest test score attained. He then derived a weekly assessment of the 
student’s odds of meeting the graduation standard. This revealed a distinct NVPSO pattern: He 
personally supervised most of the school-developed assessments and mandated multiple test-
preparation strategies.  
I do this for a reason. To piggyback on what the guidance department is doing, and I 
have three counselors here, which is a lot for a small school. I have a kind of a unique 
model but I must do this in order to ensure that nothing is missed. {For example] I 
know this kid already qualifies for a Regents diploma. So now my next step with this 
student is trying to get her to the Advanced Regents. She’ll sit for the Spanish 
Regents… I meet with the guidance staff weekly in looking at what we need to do to 
get the kids to the next level…We review prior exams, obviously… In the regular 
class we try to piggyback other areas in order to reiterate and to review things that are 
supposed to be—content that should be known for exams. We have a slew of 
Regents review books that the teachers use all the time.  And in fact, the teachers 
know that in the ‘do-now’ assignment [in every class] and homework assignment and 
exams I expect, not Regents questions, but Regents-type questions...We [require] 
mock Regents exams.  Many instances, six weeks to three months before [the actual 
test]. 
Principal Morrison had internalized this bureaucratic target as an essential managerial task, and 
personally made sure it was accomplished. In turn, he expected his teachers and guidance counselors 
to internalize the tasks of test-preparation and diagnostic testing as he mandated them.  
 Market and political accountabilities provide other examples of uncontested demands being 
personally met by NVPSO principals. Principal Hemingway, for example, saw his market 
accountability as requiring that he compete for the best students. But he differed from the ICILSO 
principals. His market accountability was not enacted as a way to support his professional 
judgments, but rather in reaction to a mental model drawn from the corporate world. He explained:  
[T]he way marketing works in the [school] system is not the same way as it works in 
business, okay?  Because I think in business, barriers between the different markets 
are a lot greater.  There’s a much more distinct demarcation between markets in a 
line of business. Whatever market a kid might be in; let’s say the kid is interested in 
architecture and he might want to go to architecture school.  Still, a lot of what he 
wants he can get from [another] school.  So even though he might have an 
orientation towards architecture…[a competing principal can say], ‘Hey, look, I’ve 
got a phenomenal academic program.  We don’t have architecture, but we have art, 
okay, and I’ve got this great math and science program, where, you learn a lot of 
what you need to become an architect.’”   
Principal Hemingway concluded that his segment of the student market required one-to-one 
recruitment of students because the competition was able to blur market barriers. Like other 
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NVPSO principals, he took on these marketing tasks, construing his job as a personal competition 
between rival principals. 
 Principal Shelly described an example of uncontested political accountability in which his 
reaction was uncomplicated by other pressures, but also required his time-consuming attention. In 
speaking of his school’s district-mandated School Leadership Team (SLT)—a combination of 
community members, parents, and school staff that provides an avenue for parental and community 
involvement—he said “ 
I intentionally tried to create opportunities for the community to actually look at 
things and make decisions. So, for example, when we got ready to start our second 
trimester, we wanted to change the bell schedule because of issues with physical 
education, that sort of thing.  We presented that to the school leadership team and 
allowed them to make the decision, which they did. They agreed with what I had 
suggested. Recently, we were asked to participate in the new incentive program for 
students, the cell phone incentive program. And that I felt was a great opportunity 
for the leadership team to make a decision, so we presented that to them and they 
made a decision about that, as well…I presented [these decisions] not as ‘We’ve 
decided this’, but [as] ‘This is a proposal that we had’. And I had a bell schedule with 
the word ‘draft’ on it. 
In this case, the principal construed his political accountability to the SLT as making sure they felt 
involved, even though the decision was already made. Similarly, he asked his community partner to 
staff a desk in his office. He justified it as a way to give his partnering organization a sense of 
ownership for and commitment to administrative decisions emanating from his office.   
Thus, all six principals in ICILSO or NVPSO reported low to moderate amounts of conflict 
in their accountability environment. The small school principals among them seemed to have 
engineered this by ignoring some incentives and information as unwanted distractions, 
compartmentalizing decision situations and acting as if their choices were simple. The large school 
principals among them imputed common interests and motives to all parties, reframing their 
decisions as having multiple sources of influence, all reinforcing their own professional judgments. 
These principals were the most sanguine about their ability to thrive in the face of bureaucratic 
constraints by making active use of markets and political support. They revealed a capacity to see 
support and alignment where others saw conflict and stress. In their different ways, all six can be 
said to be “empowered,” even though the small school principals among them could also be seen as 
personally over-committed. 
The other four SSOs attracted principals who held more skeptical views of the regime’s 
empowering policies. These principals led an equal number of large and small schools. The 
accountability they describe is one of heightened awareness of their obligations to the school’s 
external constituents and their own professional goals, often in conflict with the DOE’s 
expectations. For example, small school Principal Tan (ESO) spoke at length about how his school 
is distinctive, and unusual within the system.  
I think I need to explain our governance system, how we work here. This is not a top 
down organization. I don’t make all the decisions and then everybody has to do what 
I say…I believe that teachers know their students and know the curriculum better 
than I do. They’re with their students every day. I’m not…It’s a harder way to run 
the school. Some decisions take a little longer to make than others because they’re 
talked out a lot and people have to really agree. Consensus is a hard thing to do. You 
might have a dissenting opinion and if the consensus goes the opposite way, you 
need to agree to buy into that even though you don’t believe in it or even though you 
don’t think it’s right…It’s a harder way to operate; it’s a lot more stressful.  It’s much 
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easier to say, ‘This is what I want you to do, now you need to do it.’ It’s very simple 
to do that. But I believe that that’s not a good process because you don’t have buy-in, 
you have people that might become very unhappy about what they need to do and 
how they want to educate their students. 
He provided several critical incidents that demonstrated this distinctiveness, including deep concern 
about pedagogical directives from DOE that conflicted with the schools’ own hard-won vision of 
best practice. Rather than believing he was given the tools to shape his own school’s image and 
pedagogical orientation, he felt hemmed in by useless bureaucratic requirements.  
 I am not a political person. However, when you become a principal you learn 
to become one, because you need to, very quickly.  It’s numbers, it’s all about 
numbers, and I think that’s what’s happening now in New York City with all these 
requirements and assessments. What I was very insulted about as an educator was 
the fact that all of a sudden New York City decided that they needed to do interim 
assessments and periodic assessments. Well you know what? That’s what teachers 
do. We always periodically assess our students. I mean how else can you do it? But 
now, it has to be a standardized assessment. Why?  Why?  I want to know why? 
Because the powers that be need to show that there’s improvement because of 
mayoral take over! I really believe that. 
 
Unlike the large school principals in ICILSO or the small ones in NVPSO, Tan and others 
in this conflicted group argued that their identification with their school’s broader community didn’t 
translate into meaningful advocacy. It sometimes left them feeling powerless. As large school 
Principal Angelo (ESO) put it: “I do feel a huge sense of responsibility to my constituency because I 
feel like they have no voice. I feel like they’re misunderstood in the City of New York. I feel like 
they’re seen as a threat because they’re boys of color.” She was especially upset by the lack of an 
opportunity to hash out her pedagogical and philosophical disagreements with district officials. “Part 
of the thing that’s so scary and so disgusting about the progress model is that there’s no fight 
moment, right?  There’s no fight moment.”  
Principal Cather was especially thoughtful in the ways that he described his disillusion. 
Mindful that his school was founded with a great deal of district fanfare and external support, he put 
his conflicts this way: 
[Cather High School] was founded under this new wave of those of us who were 
trying to come back into the system to break up the large under-performing schools 
in [this neighborhood] to find alternative ways of approaching pedagogy, 
approaching practice, to develop and define new best practices in order to move the 
kids where we need to go… However, with this new administration there’s this 
emphasis on data more particularly… So I’ve had to adjust a little bit… And what 
I’ve had to do is I’ve had to decide what’s more important. To hold on to what I 
believe? No. 
When we founded the school we were based on portfolio. We did a lot of project-
based activities. And the Regents [examinations] was something that loomed large. 
We didn’t have them until sophomore, junior year. We really believed that we could 
change the attitude, the academics, of our incoming students and if we gave them a 
wonderful project-based, small-group, class size, type of curriculum that was heavily 
into the humanities that our students would automatically do well on Regents. We 
found out that they not always performed as well. It wasn’t automatic. So we’ve had 
to make some corrections. We’ve also found over the last couple of years that we’ve 
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had to do a little bit more test prep. Not as a focus, but learning how to sit for the 
exam. Have the Regents taken on a little bit of perhaps a disproportionate amount of 
role in our lives? Sure. But that’s the [new] reality. 
 
Unlike the confident, do-it-yourself principals leading small NVPSO schools or ICILSO 
principals who used market signals to support their professional judgments, these large and small 
school principals felt disadvantaged by the expectation that they should compete for students, 
teachers and DOE rewards. Small school Principal Steinbeck (KNLSO) spoke for many when he 
said, “The competition, in some ways, [is] not really fair, it’s not on a fair playing field…when we 
first opened the school, I did a lot of recruiting by myself.” Like NVPSO principals, she took on the 
work herself,  “I was the everything recruiter.  I put days and nights and hours into recruiting.” But 
unlike them, she was demoralized by the exercise. “I found out who was my main competition and 
why. There’s a school not too far from us… and they had been in existence for years prior to us, but 
why they were a big lure is they gave laptops to incoming freshmen.  So, they were, they were big 
competition… Now that’s a competition that I’m recently running against now, and we didn’t have 
this problem [before].” She believed she lacked the budget to compete effectively. 
Small school Principal Ishiguro (LLSO) also found that her market accountability was in 
conflict with the high standards she wanted for the students in her school. “I feel the pressure to 
compete. I compete for students, and I compete for teachers…because of the theme of my school 
[requires] somebody who has an appreciation for the [our theme] and somebody who can pretty 
much deliver and execute a lesson.” But she went on to say that as free agents teacher were hard to 
keep in her low-income neighborhood. So she was forced to take many who she knew in advance 
would be transient. “Those alternative certification folks, it’s a hit or miss. Because they have a Peace 
Corps mentality. I mean I’m parochial school trained so [for me, teaching] is a vocation. It’s a calling. 
The [alternative certification applicants], they’re career changers” [Emphasis in original]. As a result 
of competing for teachers, she felt forced to lower her standards. “How about some common sense 
in the classroom? Someone who commands respect…Someone that children can look up to who 
doesn’t come in with piercing and tattoos. I mean I’m dealing with minority children that haven’t 
even been out of the borough to travel. How about that?” 
In a manner similar to that reported in studies of putatively “empowered” corporate middle 
managers, this 60% of principals in our study reported a high incidence of complex accountability 
that revealed a lack of trust in the district. Large school Principal Bronte (KNLSO), for example, felt 
manipulated. “[The bureaucrats in DOE] are very clever.  They have completely figured out how 
they are going to say ‘We’re going to empower you, but by the way, you better have gotten A, B, C, 
D, E, F, G done.’ Of course, you know there is only one way to get all those things done. So they 
have created the assessment tool, which guides what you have to do…So, they are very clever 
people.”  
Large school Principal Ellison (CLSO) described the principalship in defeated terms: “I feel 
as though I’m sitting in the firing line, the only one in the middle, and everybody else is shielded. It’s 
a very lonely position. I’ve accepted the challenge, and I’ve walked into it knowing that it has its own 
reality. And yet, at the same time, I feel as though I have 17 different bosses.” Some were explicit 
about feeling personally disrespected. Large school Principal Murdoch (CLSO) told me “I think the 
one thing that many of us resent…[is] that it’s not often respected that we have put the time into the 
system, and we have done it for the right reason. And there is no effort on any level other than the 
people that we interact with closely that we are ever given an opportunity to be looked at as people 
who have dedicated their careers to the system and to the students in the system. I know that I am 
not the only one that feels that.” 
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Many believed that in such an environment, some schools and principals would win, but 
others would lose over the long term. To avoid feeling helpless, Large School Principal Murdoch 
(CLSO) cultivated a vision of the principalship as a relatively short part of one’s educational career 
“In yesteryear, you were a veteran principal when you had ten, 15 years [as a principal] in the system. 
I hardly think that five years in the system makes me a veteran principal. Sadly in their eyes now at 
six years I am a veteran principal”. She went on: When they ask me now ‘Why did you do this?’, the 
answer for me is truthful. I never wanted to be a principal, but when the opportunity was presented 
to me to be the principal of the school that gave me the tools where I am today, I had no choice but 
to say yes. Because for me, coming back here to lead a school that I totally believe in, that’s a full 
circle in your career…Would I do it now over again knowing what I know now? I don’t think so.”  
 
Non-Policy Factors: Principal Experience and Student Performance 
On-the-job experience and the school’s education challenge also affected principals’ 
reactions to accountability. Overall, experienced principals (n=9) reported more alignment between 
DOE obligations and their own professional judgments than did early career principals (n=9). But 
principals of schools teaching 3rd quartile Peer Index students (n=8), including experienced ones, 
reported more conflict between DOE requirements and their professional judgment than did schools 
with students in the bottom or 2nd quartiles of the Peer Index (n=10). Below, content and tone 
analysis of the incidents in question shows how these two correlations illuminate the role of 
experience and educational challenge in principals’ reactions to accountability.  
Experienced principals (5,6 yrs.) reported 82% of all the incidents in which bureaucratic 
regulations supported the principal’s professional commitments (.701, p = .01), either because 
principals found the district’s new data tools valuable, or because they had attracted special favor 
from the district as the result of being known. In contrast, early career principals (1-4 yrs.) reported 
significant amounts of conflict with district directives, even when outside agencies—the state, a 
partnering CBO, an SSO network leader—supported their professional judgments (-.486, p=. 05).  
Inquiry teams were a popular topic among the experienced principals who reported 
bureaucratic and professional alignment (24%; 4 incidents from 4 principals).19 These mandated 
school-based teams of educators were intended to support principals in expanding the school’s 
“sphere of success,” by serving as “a vehicle for distributing school leadership broadly” (Talbert et 
al., 2009, p.5). The DOE refers to inquiry teams as one of each principal’s accountability tools. The 
inquiry team concept is disseminated and supported by SSOs. 
According to experienced principals in our study, inquiry teams helped to spread out the 
responsibility for meeting the ambitious graduation rate targets that were crucial to each principal’s 
career because principals’ performance was being measured by such targets. Principal Morrison 
explained how he responded to this incentive: “[My] inquiry team work[s] with a group …of 
students who have been chosen based on the fact that they are not on track [to graduate] but should 
be. [W]e’re trying to figure out what it is that’s keeping them off track.” His strategy was to explain 
“what [the inquiry team] was about and [ask] them if they’d be interested to submit a letter to me 
indicating they’re interested and set up a meeting…[P]eople would rather get paid for something 
they want to do rather than something they’re not that invested in. And I was fortunate that the two 
people that wanted to do this were very gung-ho.” For Morrison, the crucial task was to identify 
teachers “really interested in finding the reasons that these kids are having these problems” so that 
                                                
19 Inquiry teams were developed as part of a process for school improvement funded by New Visions for 
Public Schools, the sponsor of the NVPSO PSO. The DOE streamlined and adopted the process as a 
requirement for all schools in 2007-08 (Robinson et al., 2008). Even so, of the four principals whose incidents 
make up this sub-group, only one was affiliated with NVPSO.  
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he could count on them to help him meet the DOE’s targets. Smaller numbers of experienced 
principals mentioned other SSO-supported accountability tools as bureaucratic support for their 
professional judgments including student-level data bases, building councils, and School Quality 
Reviews.20  
Another group of experienced principals (18%; 3 incidents from 3 principals) addressed the 
special favors that can be had when district administrators know a principal well. Principal Eliot 
described how ‘relationships’ can facilitate luck and how a good school becomes better as a result, 
“The superintendent at that time from [my] region was approached by [a woman] who runs [a 
business training institute] and she said, ‘I have a program ending at a school. Would you like to 
have it at one of your schools?’…He turned to her…in the elevator and said, ‘Yes.  Let’s put it at 
that school.’…And just from that conversation in an elevator [we have] dramatically altered the lives 
of some of these kids. They’ve gone to Austria. They’ve gone to California…And they have won the 
[borough] Championship three years in a row now.”  
Many early career principals reacted quite differently to DOE rules and regulations. They 
were suspicious of the DOE motives and unprepared to use accountability tools to the same extent. 
Other research has speculated that since new high schools are opened every year and principals with 
scant teaching experience are frequently hired to run them, these principals simply do not know 
what is needed, or how to make use of the DOE’s mandated accountability tools (Hemphill et al., 
2010). Our research shows that these early career principals may have tried to circumvent DOE’s 
rules and tools when conflicts arose between them.   
Principal Salinger gave a typical incident (86%, 6 incidents from 5 principals) in which 
conflict with the DOE was only resolved by finding support outside of the district (-.486, p=. 05). 
Aiming to offer internships to potential dropouts so they might stay in school, she grew frustrated 
by DOE’s seat-time rules. She found herself “talking to other principals” asking, “You do 
internships…How is it that you [are allowed to] let your kids go every Wednesday? How do you do 
that?” One replied, “Oh, I wrote to the state [for a waiver].” Given this simple workaround, 
Principal Salinger wondered, “Why is this [waiver] a secret? No one [from the DOE or SSO] ever 
told us this. There’s no manual for principals. You really have to do all the grunt work yourself. 
Nobody tries to help you” More than querulous, the experience made her mistrustful even after she 
got the waiver.  “As a matter of fact, I didn’t even inform my superintendent.” 
The average achievement level of the school’s student body also influenced how a principal’s 
job experience affected his perception of conflict with DOE. The school’s Peer Index helped to 
explain a large proportion of the conflict that even experienced principals had with DOE directives.  
The more accomplished the students, the more likely its principal was to perceive conflicts between 
DOE’s requirements and his professional judgments. For principals leading schools with Peer 
Indices in the 3rd quartile, the unerring focus on meeting minimum test score targets and graduating 
all students, as well as mandates to use the accountability tools, put unacknowledged limits on 
expectations for higher performing students.  
Principals of schools with 3rd quartile Peer Indices recounted significantly more conflicts 
between their bureaucratic obligations to DOE and their professional commitments (.508, p = .05) 
and also three-way conflict between bureaucratic, professional and political influences (.510, p=. 05) 
                                                
20 School-level student data provided by the district to SSOs and the schools represented 18% of these 
incidents (3 incidents from 3 principals). Two principals told incidents about each of the following DOE 
structures: building councils that helped small school leaders collaborate when sharing a single campus, two-
day School Quality Reviews conducted by external consultants, and new processes that streamlined the 
termination of teachers. One principal gave an example lauding a district employment category that was no 
longer in existence when he spoke. 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 20 No. 1  
 
 
30 
than did principals leading schools with students who tested lower on the Peer Index scale. The 
largest group of such incidents dealt with a clash between the DOE’s many expectations and 
principals’ time and resource constraints (38%; 11 incidents, 7 principals). For example, experienced 
Principal Tan would have preferred a mandate that gave him a high achieving “bottom line, but 
otherwise left him alone.” “I wonder why they just don’t say to me, ‘You’re accountable for 
graduating your students…You do whatever you feel you need to do to get that job done. And that’s 
how we’ll hold you accountable.’” In his view, “That really is the crux of education.  It’s not all these 
assessments.  It’s not all these compliance issues…Leave me alone. [If left alone,] I can be in 
classrooms. There can be more fruitful discussions about instruction. All this junk takes you away 
from that…. giving me a ‘B’, giving me a ‘C’ [on the Progress Report]…[This type of] accountability 
is not for my purposes; it’s for their purposes. It’s for whatever data or statistics they want to show.” 
Parents of high-achieving students, and even the media, were also construed as a political pressure to 
provide programs and services that DOE did not reward. As Principal Ellison put it “Sometimes I 
feel as though I’m sitting in the firing line, the only one in the middle, and everybody else is shielded.  
And it’s a very lonely position.” 
Another source of conflict was the clash between the principals’ developmental goals for 
students or teachers and the DOE’s emphasis on outcomes (21%, 6 incidents from 5 principals). 
Principal Bronte’s explanation of the tension was typical. “You have to make decisions between how 
much test prep you’re going to do versus how much instruction you do…[that] may not necessarily 
benefit the students for that particular test, but you feel it is the best thing educationally.” 21 
Helping to make the case that the school’s educational challenge interacts with other 
perceived deficits, Table 6 shows that principals whose schools were in the bottom or 2nd quartiles 
on the Peer Index told us significantly more incidents in which the DOE’s rules supported their 
professional judgment, but only when it was external actors who caused political problems for the 
schools (-.476, p=. 05). In one example of how this complex interaction worked (5 incidents from 4 
principals), early career Principal Ishiguro recounted how it took three years for her to make an 
important change in her external partner, although it delayed needed improvements in her low-
performing school.  “While sitting as a principal for three years, I knew that [my partnering 
organization] wasn’t delivering services the way I felt that they should…Their [staff] attrition was 
relatively high and [each new employee] …knew less than the prior person. But she pursued a 
change only when DOE created an open enrollment opportunity, validating her instincts. “[When 
the DOE’s] RFP process opened up and we were on the list to pick [a new partner]… I already 
knew who I had in mind. I had five top contenders and I went for it.”  
As the patterning of these incidents shows, experienced principals of high achieving schools 
conceptualized their job more broadly than did the DOE, chafing at the limitations imposed on 
their discretion that were implied by high-stakes performance targets aimed at low-achieving 
students. But when experienced principals led low achieving schools, such conflicts nearly 
disappeared; instead they valued the data tools that the district provided to meet its targets because 
these tools helped them enlist teachers and other staff in the work of diagnosing and supporting 
students.  
On the other hand, early career principals often felt they lacked the resources and support 
they needed. They also lacked the confidence to use the accountability tools as readily as their more 
experienced counterparts. They may have had insufficient experience to sort through the 
                                                
21 Principals leading schools with relatively high performing students also told us more complex incidents in 
which bureaucratic accountability conflicted with their professional judgments and simultaneously with what 
some parents wanted from the school (.510, p =.05). These six incidents from five 3rd quartile Peer Index 
principals each represented one-off content. 
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responsibilities of managing relationships with parents and other external actors without the active 
intervention of DOE. These findings are especially troublesome because early career principals led 
twice as many of the low-achieving schools as did experienced principals in this sample, and they led 
somewhat more small schools.  
 
Policy Implications  
In theory, all New York City high school principals were to be advantaged by the small 
school and SSO policies intended to implement the system’s Diverse Provider Regime. Principals 
were targeted as politically powerful actors. Whether new or experienced, principals were envisioned 
as sufficiently competent to benefit from the additional discretion given them. Student outcomes 
were assumed to result from their choices, albeit steered by a set of sharp consequences. In political 
terms, the district enhanced principals’ blocking power22 by making them responsible for 
establishing the instructional, disciplinary and cultural norms of the school, and reinforced that 
power by allowing them to screen students and select a like-minded School Support Organization 
(Schneider & Sidney, 2009).  
Yet the evidence from this study suggests that most principals did not react to the incentives 
built into these policies as intended. Most principals stuck to known support systems rather than 
taking risks with their new powers. They felt beleaguered rather than empowered. Some of the risk-
averse principals voiced concerns that New York City’s high stakes accountability context could cut 
short their careers as likely as it might reward them. But another source of their reactions was Mayor 
Bloomberg’s efforts to establish a new activist governing regime of diverse educational providers—
small schools and SSOs—which focused on raising the bottom of the achievement spectrum. 
New York City’s high school principals balanced an array of demands and expectations 
emanating from the district office, parents, teachers, collaborating organizations, their training, 
professional experience and moral commitments as well as competition from other schools. Among 
the principals interviewed here, these multiple accountabilities were about twice as likely to be in 
conflict with one another as to be unopposed or reinforced. Our analysis shows too that while 
accountability conflict was widely experienced, it was most acute among early career principals 
leading low achieving small schools. This remains a growing category in the city because new small 
schools are created to supplant large schools with low-achieving students.  
Conflict among differing types of accountability was the most evident indicator of 
beleaguered principal perceptions; tone was a second indicator. While experienced and early career 
principals both reported conflict when they competed for students and teachers, choosing their own 
SSO was a more difficult task for early career principals leading new small open-enrollment schools 
than it was for experienced principals leading large, politically embedded neighborhood schools. 
Small school principals were often heading schools with no established clientele and unknown 
teacher quality; and small schools proved more vulnerable to test score volatility. Their principals 
found it difficult to anticipate the educational services they would need.  
To complicate matters further, many principals understood that high-stakes rewards focused 
on the bottom of the achievement distribution, thus frustrating those who chose to service the 
learning needs of higher achieving students, whether in small or large schools. Disillusion set in 
among some who felt they were not rewarded for their efforts to improve education for higher 
achieving students.  
                                                
22 Blocking power refers to the ability to quash the agendas of others with regard to the school curriculum, 
teaching styles, and disciplinary procedures. 
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For such reasons, the majority of principals in this study (60%) described New York City’s 
Diverse Provider Regime as fraught with conflicting accountabilities. The combination of variable 
sized schools, and multiple service providers in a high-stakes accountability environment created an 
abundance of no-win decision situations in which a series of bad choices had to be made. 
As anticipated by research on mid-level managers (Osterman, 2009), this beleaguered group 
also responded to queries about their accountability with stress, insecurity, and mistrust. Phrases like 
“scary and disgusting”, “threat”, “on the firing line”, “very lonely position”, “not often respected” 
peppered their descriptions of their job and the choices they were asked to make. For these 
principals, empowerment required more than freedom to make decisions, and rewards for good 
ones. Many describe the need for district support services and external resources, which are not yet 
available.  
The high principal transience found in this study and by others may be partly explained by 
these findings. Our research suggests that being the principal of a small high school with students 
chosen from throughout the city may diminish a principal’s political resources, when compared to 
neighborhood schools that have large student populations and local constituencies. These principals 
may quickly become overwhelmed by conflicting demands and feel isolated – even targeted—when 
they discover they have few political resources in the school community with which to push back at 
district policy.  
 Should our research proves reliable when replicated, we anticipate that Diverse Provider 
Regimes like New York City’s will systematically disadvantage early career principals who lead small 
schools, setting them up for disillusion, stress, mistrust, and extreme transience.  At the same time, 
experienced and inexperienced principals alike may become disillusioned because they are no longer 
rewarded for providing a rich educational environment to higher achieving students. Under this set 
of circumstances, the Diverse Provider Regime could be said to provide too many choices while 
offering insufficient support. Like market systems elsewhere, Diverse Provider Regimes require a 
delicate balance of regulation, information, professional services and risk-taking. Empowerment 
policies such as those studied here appear insufficient to the task of improving the confidence and 
competence of school leaders, even as they are identified as the key decision makers on behalf of 
students. 
But what can we learn from those who did report being empowered? Should they not be the 
policy focus? Whether leading large or small schools, the principals who chose to affiliate with either 
NVPSO or the now defunct ICILSO communicated a sense of confidence, control and creativity. 
Those principals conveyed their decisions as over-determined, rather than conflicted. Although the 
small school principals among them relied less on their professional judgments as a touchstone for 
their decision-making than did the large school principals, making choices about how to proceed 
was not difficult because most incidents were construed either as the alignment of multiple sources 
of accountability or simply uncontested, legitimate demands. Either way of framing critical incidents 
led to a single decision in which these principals voiced great confidence. In their separate ways, 
both groups fit the expectations of empowered professionals unperturbed by either the demands of 
the district or market competition.  
Notwithstanding these principals relatively high transience (30%), advocates of the New 
York City Diverse Provider Regime might expect this group to become model intrapreneurs; the 
core leaders of a decentralized system of schools. Given the high interest in principal preparation 
and mentoring (The Wallace Foundation, 23 August, 2011), should not these principals guide our 
preparation of others? Should we teach new principals to recognize and compartmentalize multiple, 
conflicting accountabilities until they have sufficient on-the-job experience to make good use of the 
resources provided? Might it be possible for beleaguered, but experienced, principals to learn self-
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confidence and the ability to reframe problems into opportunities from their empowered large 
school counterparts? If these are the tasks required to expand the empowered minority of New York 
City principals into a majority, they are daunting, and will require outsized resources of their own.  
But that appear doubtful now. Not only are the theoretical benefits of market governance 
hard to capture, markets involve well-known tradeoffs. Market formation as a policy instrument, and 
market-based governing regimes in general, have the benefits of being responsive to local needs and 
preferences, flexible and open to innovation while (often) promoting local community spirit and 
solidarity. But their weaknesses are also well known. Chief among them is their inequality for service 
recipients, and sometimes for service providers as is evident among the principals studied here 
(Howlett & Ramlesh, 1995).  
Markets also have other, less discussed, weaknesses that would hamper efforts to create a 
large pool of empowered principals in New York City. Market-based systems require high levels of 
trusted information to operate efficiently and effectively. For example, principals would need to 
know a great deal about their students’ competencies and their teachers’ skills in order to predict the 
resources needed to improve both. They also need much information about the range of services 
available, their relative efficacy and the trade-offs in costs. Parents would need to know a great deal 
about how principals make decisions and how data is used to make effective choices about the right 
schools for their children. District officials would need to use reliable and valid measures of school 
performance that do not skew principal decisions in inappropriate ways, and they need to apply their 
sanctions and rewards transparently so that principals and the public both trust the outcomes. 
Moreover, markets are frequently more costly because of the loss of economies of scale brought 
about by local responsiveness and decentralized purchasing (Howlett & Ramlesh, 1995). Scaling up 
to the level of mass service provision is something markets do poorly without large infusions of 
wealth and well-founded public trust. Given enough trust and enough public wealth, markets can 
operate efficiently, but neither wealth nor trust seems likely to grow under the current politics of 
austerity, budget cuts and public mistrust of big institutions.  
In sum, market-based governing regimes have theoretical assumptions that can be thwarted 
by their own weaknesses. New York City’s Diverse Provider Regime may be one case in point. If it 
is to avoid this fate, our research suggests that much more needs to be done to provide most, if not 
all, high school principals with the attitudes and skills currently held by a minority. 
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